Russia is a declining power

Data current as of October 2026.

Russia remains a major military power, a nuclear superpower, a significant energy exporter, and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Yet these advantages obscure a more consequential long-term trend: Russia is losing ground relative to the countries that will shape the coming decades, in a world where economic dynamism, technological innovation, demographic health, and international partnerships increasingly determine national power.

The distinction between absolute and relative decline is essential. Russia does not need to become poorer every year, lose every war, or experience political collapse to be a declining power. It can retain formidable military capabilities while its share of the world's economic, technological, and diplomatic weight steadily shrinks. That is the claim of this article, and it is a claim about Russia's position relative to others, not a prediction that the Russian state is about to fail.

The argument is not confined to Russia's critics. In 2014, the realist scholar John Mearsheimer, who blamed the West rather than Moscow for the Ukraine crisis, nonetheless wrote that "Russia is a declining power, and it will only get weaker with time."¹ The decade since has largely borne him out.

Russia's predicament is particularly striking because it possesses enormous natural resources, a highly educated population, a substantial scientific heritage, and a long history of great-power status. Its relative decline is not inevitable. But its current trajectory raises serious structural questions about whether the country can convert these advantages into lasting prosperity and influence.

1. The Difference Between Absolute and Relative Decline

A country can grow richer while becoming less powerful relative to its competitors. If one economy grows by 1 percent a year while its peers grow by 3 or 4 percent, its share of global output falls every year, even though it never shrinks.

National power is also multidimensional. It includes economic output, technological sophistication, military effectiveness, demographic resources, financial influence, diplomatic relationships, and the ability to turn resources into practical results. Russia performs unevenly across these dimensions. It retains considerable strengths in nuclear weapons, energy resources, military technology, and certain scientific fields. Its weaknesses lie in economic scale, technological breadth, and demography.

The scale gap is large. According to International Monetary Fund estimates for 2025, Russia's economy was worth about $2.5 trillion at market exchange rates, compared with roughly $19.4 trillion for China and $30.6 trillion for the United States.² Measured at purchasing power parity, which adjusts for differences in domestic prices, Russia looks considerably stronger, at about $7.1 trillion, but still far behind China (about $41 trillion) and the United States (about $30.6 trillion).

These measures answer different questions. Purchasing power parity better reflects what Russia can produce and buy at home, which is one reason it can sustain a large war economy. Market exchange rates better reflect international financial weight and the ability to buy advanced technology abroad. A respectable ranking under one measure does not establish that Russia matches the United States or China in financial influence, technological breadth, or capacity to sustain global commitments.

The central question is not whether Russia remains powerful. Clearly, it does. The question is whether it can hold its position as other major powers develop economic and technological capabilities that exceed its own. On current evidence, it is not doing so.

2. Russia's Economic Limitations

Russia's economy benefits from substantial oil and natural gas reserves, mineral wealth, agricultural production, nuclear technology, and a skilled workforce. These assets provide important sources of revenue and strategic leverage.

Nevertheless, Russia has struggled to diversify beyond commodities and industries connected to the state. An economy dependent on energy exports is vulnerable to commodity-price fluctuations, changes in global demand, technological transitions, and the bargaining power of major customers.

Sanctions imposed after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have added further complications. Russia has redirected trade toward countries such as China and India, developed alternative financial and logistical arrangements, and maintained substantial export revenues during parts of the war. These adaptations demonstrate resilience. But adapting to sanctions is not the same as eliminating their long-term costs. Restrictions on advanced technologies, capital markets, and cooperation with Western industrial firms make it harder to modernize important sectors. Imports through intermediaries fill some gaps, but at higher cost and with new dependencies.

A Wartime Boom, Then a Stall

The growth record tells the story plainly. Wartime spending produced a genuine boom: after revisions, Rosstat now puts growth at 4.1 percent in 2023 and 4.9 percent in 2024. Then the economy stalled, growing about 1.0 percent in 2025.³ The outlook is no better. The World Bank expects growth of 0.8 percent in 2026, below the roughly 2 percent average of 2010 to 2019, citing capacity constraints, restrictive monetary policy, high borrowing costs, sanctions, and refinery outages. The IMF's October 2026 outlook puts Russian growth at 0.9 percent in both 2026 and 2027, against 3.7 percent and 4.4 percent for emerging market and developing economies as a group.⁴ An economy growing at a quarter to a fifth of the pace of its peer group loses relative weight every year.

Russia's wartime economic performance also requires careful interpretation. Military production raises measured output, creates jobs, and expands some factories and technical skills. But weapons and ammunition consumed in combat do not improve civilian living standards or build a lasting stock of civilian capital, and every worker and ruble absorbed by the war is unavailable for civilian investment.

The Fiscal Burden of the War

The burden is heavy and growing. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that federal budget funding of the war and other military spending reached about 16 trillion rubles in 2025, or 7.5 percent of GDP.⁵ The 2026 budget planned a reduction, but spending moved the other way. Janis Kluge, an economist at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), estimates that military spending in the first half of 2026 reached 10.7 trillion rubles, up 30 percent on the same period a year earlier. That half-year total alone equals 4.7 percent of projected full-year GDP, and Kluge projects the annual figure could approach 9 percent of GDP if the pace continues.⁶ The government has since raised its 2026 budget deficit estimate from 1.6 percent to 3.2 percent of GDP.⁷

Russia is not facing fiscal exhaustion. Its public debt remains low by the standards of advanced economies, and the state can raise taxes, borrow domestically, and reorder priorities for some time. But spending on this scale competes directly with civilian investment, infrastructure, education, health care, and research. The more plausible outcome is an economy that keeps functioning while falling steadily further behind more technologically advanced and diversified economies.

3. The Demographic Challenge

Demography is another important constraint on Russia's future power.

Russia's total fertility rate was about 1.36 children per woman in 2025, according to Rosstat data, far below the replacement level of roughly 2.1. Russia recorded about 1.22 million births in 2024, the fewest since 1999.⁸ These problems predate the invasion of Ukraine. They reflect two separate forces: the collapse in births during the 1990s, which shrank the number of women now in their main child-bearing years, and low fertility among those smaller cohorts. Even if fertility rises, the small size of those cohorts limits how fast births can recover.

The war adds further pressure. Casualties, military recruitment, the movement of workers into defense industries, and the emigration of skilled workers after 2022, including many in information technology, all tighten an already strained labor market. The precise consequences are difficult to measure, partly because estimates vary and partly because Rosstat stopped publishing regular birth data after April 2025.⁹ When a government stops publishing its birth statistics, that is itself a signal.

The demographer Nicholas Eberstadt has argued that these constraints are gradually but relentlessly narrowing what the Russian state can do on the international stage. He describes Russia as a "high education/low human capital" society, one whose extensive formal schooling does not translate into strong health or productivity, and he suggests that foreign-policy risk-taking may compensate for declining national potential for a time but cannot do so indefinitely.¹⁰

A declining or aging workforce does not automatically doom a country. Productivity improvements, automation, immigration, better health, and more effective education can offset some demographic pressures, and Japan has shown that an aging society can remain technologically sophisticated. But such adaptations require investment, institutional competence, and sustained technological progress. Russia faces labor shortages, restricted technology imports, and the diversion of resources to the military all at once, which makes adaptation much harder.

Russia also faces a geographic problem. It must administer and defend an enormous territory containing valuable resources, extensive infrastructure, and long borders. A smaller or less productive working-age population makes these responsibilities more expensive relative to the resources available. Demography is not destiny, but it narrows the range of choices available to Russia's leaders and makes productivity growth essential.

4. The Technological Gap

Modern national power depends increasingly on advanced semiconductors, computing infrastructure, artificial intelligence, robotics, precision manufacturing, aerospace systems, biotechnology, and other technologies that support both civilian and military production.

Russia retains important capabilities in nuclear engineering, missile technology, military systems, mathematics, and selected areas of scientific research. It would be inaccurate to portray the country as technologically backward in every field.

The difficulty is that technological power depends on more than individual scientific achievements. It requires extensive networks of suppliers, reliable access to specialized components, competitive companies, investment capital, research institutions, and large markets that allow innovations to be commercialized. The United States has a broad ecosystem spanning semiconductor design, software, cloud computing, research universities, venture capital, and leading technology firms. China has built enormous manufacturing capacity and made major advances in electric vehicles, batteries, telecommunications, and renewable energy.

The gap shows up in comparative measures. In the World Intellectual Property Organization's Global Innovation Index 2025, the United States ranked 3rd, China 10th, and Russia 60th.¹¹ The index is a composite and does not capture every strategic technology, but a gap of that size is consistent with an innovation system that excels in pockets rather than across whole industries.

Russia's dependence on imported components and equipment in advanced sectors creates vulnerabilities when access to suppliers is restricted, and the post-2022 departure of technical talent compounds the problem. Artificial intelligence illustrates the broader challenge. Competing at the frontier requires computing resources, advanced chips, electricity, data centers, research talent, software ecosystems, and investment. Russia has scientific talent and abundant energy, but these do not compensate for weaknesses in the other components.

When technology increasingly shapes military effectiveness, productivity, and security, the ability to innovate across entire industries may matter more over time than excellence in a limited number of specialized fields.

5. The War in Ukraine: Tactical Adaptation, Strategic Costs

Russia's war against Ukraine provides an important test of its military capabilities and strategic judgment.

Russia possesses enormous military resources, a large defense-industrial base, substantial missile capabilities, and the ability to sustain a prolonged conflict. Its forces have adapted quickly at the tactical and technological levels. A July 2026 analysis by the Royal United Services Institute describes a distributed strike complex of drones and long-range fires able to hit Ukrainian supply lines up to 100 kilometers behind the front. The same analysis finds that these gains have not produced operational coherence, because a politically driven command structure rewards compliance over initiative. It calls Russia a system that learns selectively.¹²

That balance is the right one. A serious analysis should not assume that Russia is incapable of learning or that its military will inevitably fail. But the war has also exposed significant weaknesses. Russia's initial campaign failed to achieve its apparent objective of rapidly subduing Ukraine. The conflict has consumed vast quantities of equipment and ammunition, imposed enormous human costs, and required the state to mobilize extensive economic resources for military purposes.

The war's ultimate strategic consequences remain uncertain. Russia may retain occupied territory, make further gains, or secure a settlement favorable to some of its objectives. But territorial gains alone cannot establish whether a war has been strategically successful. A complete assessment must weigh gains against costs, original objectives, long-term security, and the opportunities sacrificed.

One major consequence is already settled: Finland joined NATO in April 2023 and Sweden in March 2024. NATO's northern flank has been transformed, and Russia now faces an alliance with additional members that bring advanced militaries and important geographic advantages. European governments have also increased attention to defense spending, ammunition production, readiness, and the security of critical infrastructure.

Here lies a fundamental strategic paradox: a country can use military force to pursue greater security and influence while provoking responses that leave it facing a more hostile and better-prepared environment.

6. The China Problem: A Partnership with an Unequal Balance

China is one of the most important variables in Russia's future.

The two countries share interests in limiting American influence, expanding cooperation outside Western-led institutions, and building economic and diplomatic relationships less vulnerable to Western pressure. China has become Russia's indispensable trading partner, its main supplier of manufactured goods, and a crucial outlet that helps Moscow manage the effects of sanctions.

But the relationship is increasingly unequal. At market exchange rates, China's economy is roughly seven to eight times larger than Russia's. Its manufacturing base, technological capabilities, and role in global supply chains give Beijing considerable leverage. Russia offers energy, raw materials, military expertise, geographic access, and strategic cooperation. These are valuable, but they do not give Moscow bargaining power equivalent to China's broader economic weight.

The relationship is not simply one of Chinese domination. Beijing has reasons to preserve a functioning Russian partnership, and Moscow retains strategic assets that China cannot easily replace. Russia also has incentives to maintain independent relationships with India, the Middle East, and other partners.

Nevertheless, Russia risks becoming the junior partner in a relationship where the stronger party has more alternatives. That is a significant change for a country that has historically sought recognition as an independent center of global power. The paradox is that Russia's effort to resist Western pressure could accelerate its dependence on another great power. Strategic autonomy requires more than freedom from American influence; it requires the economic and technological capacity to resist pressure from anyone.

7. The European Energy Market Has Changed

Energy has long been one of Russia's most important sources of revenue and geopolitical leverage. For decades, Russian natural gas supplied a substantial share of European demand, creating enduring commercial relationships and giving Moscow influence over European energy security.

That position has largely collapsed. According to the European Commission, Russia's share of total EU gas imports fell from 45 percent in 2021 to 12 percent in 2025.¹³ The change was not driven by European policy alone: Russian supply cuts in 2022 disrupted established trading relationships, while European governments sought alternative suppliers, built new infrastructure, expanded liquefied natural gas imports, and reduced consumption. Either way, the result is the same. Europe now has strong incentives to avoid renewed dependence on Russian gas, and Russia must compete for alternative markets on less favorable terms.

Redirecting natural gas is particularly difficult because pipelines are geographically fixed. The planned second pipeline to China shows the problem. In September 2026, Putin renamed the long-discussed Power of Siberia 2 project "Power of Baikal," but the project remained a plan rather than an operating pipeline, and it had stalled over disagreements about price.¹⁴ China, with many potential suppliers, can afford to wait; Russia, having lost most of its largest market, has fewer alternatives. Oil is easier to redirect by sea, but alternative buyers may demand discounts and additional shipping and insurance arrangements.

Russia's energy resources will remain valuable for decades. The issue is whether it can convert them into enough revenue and technological investment to sustain its broader economic position. Natural resources are a source of power, but they are not a substitute for a diversified, productive, and technologically sophisticated economy.

8. Russia's International Influence: Where It Is Shrinking and Where It Holds

Russia remains influential. Its nuclear arsenal, diplomatic position, energy exports, arms industry, intelligence capabilities, and relationships with many governments let it shape events far beyond its borders.

But one of its most important instruments of influence is visibly weakening. Arms sales long bound governments in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East to Moscow through equipment, training, and spare parts. SIPRI reports that Russia's major arms exports fell 64 percent between 2016–2020 and 2021–2025, the only decline among the world's top ten suppliers, and its share of global arms exports dropped from 21 percent to 6.8 percent.¹⁵ Russia remains the third-largest exporter, but this is not a forecast of decline. It is decline that has already happened, and much of it reflects a war that consumes the weapons Russia once sold abroad.

Not every indicator moves the same way, and an honest assessment should say so. Russia's nuclear-energy industry remains a genuine international force. According to Rosatom's own review of 2025, the company was building 22 large reactor units in seven countries at year-end, which it says accounts for 88 percent of the global market for exported new reactors, and its overseas project portfolio stood at $206.2 billion.¹⁶ These are company-reported figures, and a portfolio is not the same as realized revenue, but they show a sector where Russia still leads.

Influence also depends on more than the ability to threaten force or sell equipment. Economic partnerships, access to capital, technological cooperation, attractive educational institutions, cultural appeal, and reliable commercial relationships create lasting influence. The United States draws on alliances, a globally dominant financial system, leading universities, major technology companies, and the international role of the dollar. China combines a vast domestic market with manufacturing capacity, infrastructure investment, and an expanding role in trade.

Russia's advantages are different: military power, energy, nuclear technology, diplomatic experience, and a willingness to take risks that others avoid. Many governments in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East maintain relations with Moscow. These relationships help Russia avoid isolation, but they do not amount to a cohesive bloc, and they do not guarantee that other countries will prioritize Russian interests when those conflict with their own. Russia may retain considerable influence in selected regions and sectors even as its overall share of global economic power declines.

9. A Comparison with the United States and China

Comparing Russia with the United States and China clarifies the structural differences among the three powers. The comparison does not imply that every country must compete in the same way, or that national power reduces to a single statistic.

Dimension	Russia	United States / China
GDP, market rates (2025)	About $2.5 trillion	About $30.6 trillion / $19.4 trillion
GDP, purchasing power (2025)	About $7.1 trillion	About $30.6 trillion / $41 trillion
Innovation (GII 2025 rank)	60th	3rd / 10th
Demography	Fertility about 1.36; shrinking workforce	Different challenges and resources
Military power	Major nuclear and conventional forces	Extensive resources, advanced capabilities
Global economic networks	Important but comparatively limited	Central roles in finance, trade, industry

The United States and China are not interchangeable competitors. The United States has an unmatched financial system, extensive alliances, leading technology companies, and advantages in several advanced industries. China has enormous manufacturing capacity, a large industrial workforce, a vast domestic market, and strengths in electric vehicles, batteries, and clean-energy manufacturing.

Both also face serious challenges. The United States must manage political polarization, fiscal pressures, and infrastructure needs. China faces demographic decline, debt, weaknesses in its property sector, and uncertain productivity growth. Neither country's continued rise is guaranteed. But Russia's difficulty is that even if American or Chinese growth slows, it would still struggle to close gaps of this size in economic scale, technological breadth, and industrial capacity.

10. The Case Against the Decline Thesis

The strongest objection to this argument deserves a direct answer. Russia has been written off before. Many forecasts in 2022 expected sanctions to cripple the economy, yet Russia avoided collapse, grew strongly in 2023 and 2024, kept exporting energy, and sustained a large war for years. For centuries, Russia has repeatedly punched above its economic weight through state mobilization, tolerance for hardship, and willingness to bear costs that other countries will not. On this view, analysts who measure Russia by GDP tables keep underestimating it.

That record is real, and it is why this article does not predict collapse. But the objection proves less than it seems. Punching above one's weight is a strategy of mobilization, and mobilization draws down reserves: of manpower, of capital, of fiscal room, and of the civilian investment that builds future capacity. A country can sustain it for a long time, and Russia has. It cannot use it to reverse a shrinking share of world output, technology, and population. Resilience explains why Russia remains dangerous. It does not show that Russia is keeping pace.

The thesis would be genuinely weakened by different evidence: sustained productivity growth, civilian industries that become internationally competitive, a more diversified export base, and recovering shares in markets Russia has lost. Isolated successes, such as nuclear exports, do not meet that test. Broad improvement across many indicators would.

11. Could Russia Reverse Its Decline?

Russia's relative decline is the direction of current trends, not an immutable law of history. Countries recover from serious setbacks when their institutions, economic policies, and international relationships change, and Russia has assets that could support a different future: natural resources, scientific expertise, industrial experience, a vast territory, and a well-educated population.

Ending the War and Reducing Strategic Isolation

A durable end to the war could reduce the destruction of human and material resources, improve economic predictability, and allow investment to shift toward civilian production. The extent of any recovery would depend on the terms of a settlement, future security arrangements, sanctions policy, and Russia's willingness to change its external behavior. An end to fighting would not automatically restore trust or lift sanctions, and some changes in European energy policy may be effectively permanent.

Modernizing the Economy

Russia could improve its prospects by strengthening competition, encouraging productive private investment, improving the business environment, and reducing dependence on commodity revenues and politically directed spending. That would require more than new economic targets: it would depend on predictable rules, incentives for innovation, and firms able to compete without relying on political connections.

Investing in Productivity and Technology

Given Russia's demographics, productivity growth is essential. Automation, better industrial processes, modern infrastructure, research, and access to advanced equipment could offset labor shortages, but only alongside effective institutions, competitive markets, skilled workers who choose to stay, and international cooperation.

Maintaining Strategic Independence

Russia could pursue a more balanced foreign policy that preserves ties with China while developing economic relationships with India, other Asian countries, and a wider range of partners. Without a more diversified economy and greater technological independence, however, diplomatic diversification will have limited practical effect.

The greatest obstacles are political rather than purely economic. Meaningful reform would require changes in institutional incentives, governance, the relationship between the state and private enterprise, and the priorities of the leadership. Russia has the resources for a more productive path, but possessing resources and using them effectively are two different things.

12. Five Possible Futures for Russia

A useful framework comes from historian Stephen Kotkin's essay "The Five Futures of Russia: And How America Can Prepare for Whatever Comes Next."¹⁷ Writing with an eye to Russia after Putin, Kotkin presents five scenarios as tools for planning, not as predictions with established probabilities. His framework shows that Russia's future is not a simple choice between continued great-power status and sudden collapse.

Scenario 1: Russia as France

In Kotkin's most optimistic scenario, Russia becomes a stable constitutional state with a functioning rule of law and leaders subject to meaningful limits. It keeps a strong national identity and memories of imperial greatness but no longer threatens its neighbors as a routine instrument of policy.

The analogy is narrower than it may sound. It is not a claim that France has solved its political, economic, or social problems; it plainly has not. The point is that a country with an imperial past can become a constitutional state that respects its neighbors' sovereignty. Kotkin also stresses why this is hard: Russia in 1991 was much further from a stable constitutional order than France was when it made its own transition. Constitutional rules require institutions and political actors willing to respect them even when doing so is inconvenient.

Scenario 2: Russia Retrenched

Power passes to a harder-line nationalist leadership that turns inward rather than outward. The state remains authoritarian and suspicious of Western influence, but it pulls back from some foreign ambitions to concentrate on control at home. This is not reform, and it could be more repressive than the present order.

Economically, such a Russia would likely settle into prolonged stagnation. It could keep exporting energy, maintain nuclear deterrence, and fund its security services while falling further behind in economic and technological breadth, a clear case of a major power gradually losing relative influence.

Scenario 3: Russia as China's Vassal

Russia grows so dependent on China for trade, manufactured goods, technology, and finance that Beijing gains decisive influence over Russian policy. Russia keeps formal sovereignty, a nuclear arsenal, and significant military capabilities, but its practical freedom of action is constrained by Chinese preferences.

This is not inevitable. As Kotkin notes, only Beijing can decide to take on a vassal and the burdens that come with one. The concern is that a country seeking independence from the West could end up more dependent on another great power instead.

Scenario 4: Russia as North Korea

Russia becomes a very large version of North Korea: repressive at home, isolated and disruptive abroad, nuclear-armed, heavily dependent on China, yet still able to defy Beijing when its rulers choose. Security and regime survival take priority over economic modernization.

The analogy does not mean Russia would become identical to North Korea. Russia is vastly larger, richer, and better connected. The comparison describes a direction: isolation, a heavily securitized state, and an economy shaped by military and political priorities. Such a Russia would remain dangerous, but it would find it ever harder to stay technologically competitive or raise civilian living standards.

Scenario 5: Russia in Chaos

A succession crisis, elite conflict, military setback, fiscal shock, or some combination weakens the central state. Political competition becomes unpredictable, regional authorities and armed groups gain room to maneuver, and Moscow struggles to maintain control. The most extreme versions would raise urgent concerns about the security of the world's largest nuclear arsenal.

Instability does not automatically produce democracy or reform. It could lead to renewed authoritarianism, a more aggressive leadership, or a prolonged power struggle.

These scenarios are not mutually exclusive over time. Russia might stagnate for years, grow more dependent on China, and later undergo political change. A leadership transition could bring reform, renewed repression, or instability, and the path could differ across economic, political, and foreign-policy dimensions.

Kotkin's methodological point matters most: scenarios should help observers prepare for different outcomes, not encourage confidence that one is inevitable. Outside powers have limited ability to redesign Russia's political system. Russia's own institutional choices and internal dynamics will be decisive.

13. What Should Observers Watch?

Claims about Russia's decline should be tested against observable evidence rather than headlines, anecdotes, or assumptions that a particular outcome is inevitable. Several indicators deserve sustained attention:

• Productivity growth: Is Russia becoming more efficient, or is activity increasingly dependent on commodity revenues and military expenditure?
• Industrial modernization: Can Russian firms obtain and develop the advanced machinery, components, and software needed to stay competitive?
• Demographic trends: How do aging, labor-force participation, migration, and the availability of skilled workers affect productive capacity? Does Rosstat resume full publication of demographic data?
• Fiscal sustainability: Can the government finance defense and public services without increasingly damaging the civilian economy?
• Energy revenues: Can Russia maintain export volumes and favorable prices, and does the Power of Baikal pipeline move from announcement to construction?
• Dependence on China: Is the relationship becoming more balanced, or are more decisions affecting Russia being made in Beijing?
• Arms exports: Does Russia regain lost market share once wartime demand at home eases, or have former customers moved on for good?
• International relationships: Is Russia widening its circle of partners or narrowing its options through prolonged confrontation?
• Institutional constraints: Are rules becoming more predictable, and can institutions function independently of individual leaders?
• Succession and political stability: Does the system have credible procedures for leadership transition, or does it depend on one individual and a narrow circle?

These indicators are most useful together. Rising military production might show successful mobilization while concealing declining civilian investment. Rising export revenues might ease the budget while leaving technological bottlenecks unresolved. A single slow year does not prove long-term decline, and a single strong year does not prove recovery. The strongest assessment distinguishes short-term fluctuations from structural trends and stays open to evidence that challenges its expectations.

Conclusion: Russia is Major Power Losing Ground

Russia illustrates an important principle of international politics: possessing considerable power today does not guarantee holding that power tomorrow.

Russia has a formidable nuclear arsenal, extensive natural resources, substantial military capabilities, a skilled population, a world-leading nuclear-energy industry, and a permanent seat on the Security Council. It will not disappear from the ranks of important international actors. But its long-term position depends on much more than military hardware and energy exports, and on those other measures the evidence points one way. A wartime boom that has given way to growth near 1 percent while emerging economies grow nearly four times as fast. Military spending crowding out civilian investment. Fertility far below replacement and births at their lowest in decades. An innovation ranking of 60th. A collapse in its share of the European gas market and the global arms market. A partnership with China in which Russia is increasingly the junior party. A European security environment that Moscow's own war has made more hostile.

Russia has shown real resilience, and its competitors face problems of their own. It could still adapt, reform, and improve its prospects; Kotkin's scenarios are a reminder that more than one future remains possible. But on its current course, Russia's relative decline is not a distant possibility. It is already underway.

The danger is not that Russia will suddenly cease to be a major power. It is that Russia will remain a formidable military state while steadily losing economic, technological, and diplomatic weight to countries better positioned for the century ahead, and that a declining power with nuclear weapons and a habit of taking risks can be more dangerous, not less.

History offers examples of countries that kept impressive military capabilities long after their economic and technological foundations weakened, and examples of states that rebuilt their institutions and recovered. Which path Russia takes will depend on whether it can turn its substantial resources into lasting economic and technological strength. Without that transformation, it may remain a major power for decades, but a smaller one in a larger world.

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Notes

1. John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin," Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (September/October 2014): 77–89. mearsheimer.com (PDF) ↩
2. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook database, October 2025: 2025 estimates of GDP at current prices and at purchasing power parity. Figures rounded. ↩
3. Interfax, Rosstat revision of 2023 GDP growth to 4.1%, February 7, 2025, link; The Moscow Times (Russian edition, Reuters), Rosstat estimate of 1.0% growth in 2025 after a revised 4.9% in 2024, February 6, 2026, link. ↩
4. World Bank, "Russia" country overview, updated October 2026, worldbank.org; Interfax, "IMF lowers Russia growth forecast for 2026-2027 by 0.2 pp to 0.9% per year," October 13, 2026, reporting the IMF's October 2026 World Economic Outlook, link. ↩
5. Julian Cooper, "A Budget for a Fifth Year of War: Military Spending in Russia's Budget for 2026," SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2026/01 (March 2026). sipri.org (PDF) ↩
6. Janis Kluge, "Russian Military Spending Soars, Upending the Kremlin's Budget Plans," German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), September 4, 2026. swp-berlin.org ↩
7. Reuters, "Russia raises 2027 military spending by 27%, budget documents show," September 28, 2026, via Daily Maverick. link ↩
8. Novaya Gazeta Europe, "Russia's rural fertility rate falls to lowest level since Soviet period, official data shows," May 21, 2026, citing Rosstat, link; The Moscow Times, "Russia's Birth Rate Plunges to 200-Year Low," April 14, 2025, link. ↩
9. T—Zh (Tinkoff Journal), Russian-language analysis of Rosstat fertility statistics, noting that Rosstat stopped publishing birth data after April 2025. t-j.ru ↩
10. Nicholas Eberstadt, "Russian Power in Decline: A Demographic and Human Resource Perspective," AEI Foreign & Defense Policy Working Paper, American Enterprise Institute, August 24, 2022. aei.org ↩
11. World Intellectual Property Organization, Global Innovation Index 2025: Results. wipo.int ↩
12. Fabrizio Minniti and Giangiuseppe Pili, "Russia's Selective Adaptation: Command, Control and the Limits of Learning in War," Royal United Services Institute, July 22, 2026. rusi.org ↩
13. European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy, "In focus: EU energy security explained," April 20, 2026. energy.ec.europa.eu ↩
14. Reuters, "Russia's Putin renames planned 'Power of Siberia 2' pipeline to 'Power of Baikal' pipeline," September 2, 2026, via Pipeline & Gas Journal. link ↩
15. SIPRI, "Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025," SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2026. sipri.org (PDF) ↩
16. Rosatom, "Rosatom: 2025 in Review," Rosatom Newsletter, August 31, 2026. Company-reported figures. rosatomnewsletter.com ↩
17. Stephen Kotkin, "The Five Futures of Russia: And How America Can Prepare for Whatever Comes Next," Foreign Affairs 103, no. 3 (May/June 2024), published online April 18, 2024. ↩