In 2023, I wrote the essay The United States will be the leading power in the world for the foreseeable future. A lot has changed in the last 3 years and this essay provides a supplement to that essay in light of recent events.
We live in a bipolar world in a multipolar sea — and China, the junior pole, is weakening faster than expected
We live in a bipolar world in a multipolar sea. Many states—India, Turkey, France, Saudi Arabia, Brazil—are more assertive than they were a decade ago, but their activism does not translate into system‑shaping capability. The real structure of global power in 2026 is defined by two poles: the United States and China. And the deeper truth, clearer now than in 2023, is that these poles are not equal.
China is past its peak and entering a period of structural decline. The United States, despite political turbulence and global disorder, remains the system’s anchor—the only state whose economy, alliances, technologies, and military reach shape every other region’s strategic choices.
The world is noisier. The hierarchy is not.
China’s Plateau: The Challenger That Stalled
The most important geopolitical development since 2023 is not China’s rise, but China’s slowdown. The signs are now unmistakable:
Demographic contraction has accelerated, shrinking the workforce and raising dependency ratios.
The real estate and debt crises have become structural, not cyclical.
Productivity growth has stalled, and innovation is constrained by political centralization.
Export controls have slowed China’s access to advanced semiconductors.
Global manufacturing diversification—India, Vietnam, Mexico—has reduced China’s leverage.
Domestic repression has intensified, signaling regime insecurity rather than confidence.
China remains powerful, but its trajectory has flattened. It is no longer the rising superpower poised to overtake the United States. It is a formidable but constrained pole in a system still centered on Washington.
The United States: Structural Advantages That Deepened After 2023
Energy Security and Resource Independence
The U.S. remains the world’s most energy-secure major power. Domestic production, diversified supply chains, and geographic insulation give it resilience unmatched by China or Europe. As global energy demand continues to rise, this advantage grows more valuable.
Europe’s forced decoupling from Russian energy has deepened its reliance on U.S. LNG, U.S. technology, and U.S. security guarantees. China’s dependence on imported hydrocarbons remains a strategic vulnerability.
Technological Leadership and the AI Frontier
The U.S.–China technology rivalry now defines the global order, but the balance still favors Washington:
U.S. firms lead in foundational AI models.
U.S. companies dominate advanced semiconductor design.
U.S. cloud infrastructure remains unmatched.
Export controls have slowed China’s access to cutting-edge chips.
China excels in applied AI and electrification, but it has not broken the U.S.-led technological ecosystem.
Economic Gravity and Dollar Dominance
The U.S. economy has outperformed expectations since 2023. Growth has been resilient, inflation has moderated, and the dollar remains the world’s reserve currency. China’s slowdown has widened the gap. Russia’s war has degraded its industrial base. Europe is stable but not dynamic.
The U.S. remains the world’s economic anchor.
The Alliance System: Stronger Because It Was Tested
One of the most counterintuitive developments since 2023 is that U.S. domestic polarization has strengthened the U.S.-led alliance system rather than weakened it.
Europe, uncertain about long-term U.S. political continuity, has:
Increased defense spending.
Rebuilt its defense industries.
Hardened its stance toward Russia and China.
Deepened cooperation with the U.S. on energy, technology, and intelligence.
This is the paradox: The less Europe assumes the U.S. will do everything, the more Europe ends up doing things that reinforce American leadership.
NATO is larger, richer, and more militarily capable than it was in 2023. Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines have tightened security ties with Washington. India continues to hedge but leans toward U.S. technology and defense cooperation.
No rival power has anything comparable to the U.S. alliance network.
Military Power: Still Unmatched, Even in a More Competitive Indo‑Pacific
China’s naval expansion has continued, and the Western Pacific is more contested than it was three years ago. But the fundamentals remain:
The U.S. is the only country with global power projection.
The U.S. has unmatched logistics, bases, and combat experience.
China faces geographic constraints and economic headwinds.
The balance is tighter, but the hierarchy is intact.
The Paradox of American Disorder
The United States is politically polarized and institutionally noisy. Yet this disorder has not weakened its global position. In several ways, it has strengthened it:
Allies invest more in their own defense.
Rivals misread U.S. volatility as weakness and overextend.
The U.S. economy remains flexible because it is decentralized and competitive.
American domestic turbulence has not translated into strategic decline. It has produced a more resilient, distributed, and adaptive form of leadership.
A Multipolar Sea With a Single Center
Many states are more active. Only one state is indispensable.
Only the United States combines:
A continental economy
A global navy
A worldwide alliance system
Leadership in AI and semiconductors
Energy independence
A reserve currency
Cultural and technological influence
This combination remains unmatched.
The world is multipolar in activity, but not in capability. It is bipolar at the top, but the stronger pole is clear.
In 2026, the United States remains the center of the global system.
Footnotes
On a “bipolar core in a multipolar sea” and the limited system‑shaping capacity of middle powers such as India, Turkey, France, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil in the mid‑2020s, see “Global Power Map 2026: A Multipolar World Without Rules,” Profile News, December 31, 2025.
For 2026 assessments that frame the structure of global power as fundamentally defined by the United States and China rather than a fully diffuse multipolarity, see “Geopolitics in 2026: Risks and Opportunities We’re Watching,” Wellington Management, January 4, 2026.
On China’s transition from high‑growth “rise” to structurally slower expansion driven by demographics, debt, and productivity headwinds, see “China Growth to Slow in 2026 as Structural Problems Remain,” ICIS, January 18, 2026; and “China’s Economy: Rightsizing 2025, Looking Ahead to 2026,” Rhodium Group, December 21, 2025.
For analyses that still treat the United States as the central “system anchor” in 2026—combining outsized economic weight, global military reach, alliances, and technological leadership—see “Geopolitics: Power as Policy 2026,” Amundi Research Center, January 14, 2026; and “Reading Power in 2026: What the U.S. National Security Strategy Signals for Global Business,” APCO Worldwide, January 21, 2026.
On the idea that 2020s geopolitics are characterized by rising “noise” (sanctions, export controls, industrial policy) rather than a clean hierarchy but with underlying power asymmetries largely intact, see “Geopolitics: Power as Policy 2026.”
For China’s accelerating demographic contraction, shrinking workforce, and rising dependency ratios, see “China’s Population Decline: Impact on Business and the Economy,” China Briefing, June 22, 2025; and “China’s Population Turn: The Start of Long‑Term Decline?” ThinkChina, February 23, 2026.
On the property slowdown and debt overhang as structural rather than cyclical problems in China’s economy, see “China Growth to Slow in 2026 as Structural Problems Remain,” ICIS; and “Outlook of Macro Economy and Industries in 2026,” Deloitte China, December 25, 2025.
For commentary on stalled productivity growth and innovation constraints under political centralization and tighter Party control, see “China Economic Consolidation and Strategic Shifts in 2026,” Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business (CKGSB), February 3, 2026.
On U.S.-led export controls targeting China’s access to advanced semiconductors and manufacturing equipment, see discussion in “Geopolitics: Power as Policy 2026.”
For evidence of manufacturing and supply‑chain diversification away from China toward India, Vietnam, and Mexico, see “China’s Population Decline: Impact on Business and the Economy,” China Briefing (section on relocation of labor‑intensive manufacturing).
On intensifying domestic repression and its links to regime insecurity in China, see “China’s Population Turn: The Start of Long‑Term Decline?” ThinkChina, February 23, 2026.
For the argument that the U.S. remains the most energy‑secure major power—given domestic production, LNG exports, and diversified supply chains—see “2026: A Clear Path for American Energy Dominance,” ClearPath, January 21, 2026.
On continuing growth in global energy demand into the mid‑2020s, see International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2025.
For Europe’s accelerated decoupling from Russian pipeline gas and increased reliance on U.S. LNG since 2022, see “2026: A Clear Path for American Energy Dominance,” ClearPath.
On China’s strategic vulnerability due to dependence on imported hydrocarbons and seaborne energy routes, see “China Economic Consolidation and Strategic Shifts in 2026,” CKGSB.
For treatments of the U.S.–China rivalry in which technology (AI, semiconductors, digital infrastructure) is the central arena and the balance currently favors the United States, see “Geopolitics: Power as Policy 2026,” Amundi Research Center.
On U.S. leadership in foundational AI models through major U.S. firms, see “Geopolitics: Power as Policy 2026” (section on AI and digital competition).
For continued U.S. dominance in advanced semiconductor design and IP, see the same, as well as industry discussions referenced in “Reading Power in 2026: What the U.S. National Security Strategy Signals for Global Business.”
On the global scale and dominance of U.S.-based cloud providers, see “Reading Power in 2026: What the U.S. National Security Strategy Signals for Global Business,” APCO Worldwide.
For China’s strengths in applied AI, electrification, and EVs within an overall U.S.-led technology ecosystem, see “China Economic Consolidation and Strategic Shifts in 2026,” CKGSB.
On U.S. economic outperformance since 2023—resilient growth, moderating inflation, and repeated forecast upgrades—see “Geopolitics in 2026: Risks and Opportunities We’re Watching,” Wellington Management.
For continued dollar dominance as the world’s primary reserve and invoicing currency, see “Geopolitics: Power as Policy 2026.”
On the degradation of Russia’s industrial base due to its war against Ukraine and sanctions, see “Geopolitics: Power as Policy 2026” (section on Russia and energy politics).
For assessments of Europe as broadly stable but structurally less dynamic than the U.S. in growth terms by the mid‑2020s, see “Geopolitics in 2026: Risks and Opportunities We’re Watching.”
On how U.S. domestic polarization has spurred allies to invest more in their own defense and resilience, often reinforcing the U.S.-led system, see “Reading Power in 2026: What the U.S. National Security Strategy Signals for Global Business.”
For increases in European defense spending and efforts to rebuild defense industrial capacity since 2022, see NATO reporting summarized in “Reading Power in 2026: What the U.S. National Security Strategy Signals for Global Business.”
On Europe’s hardened stance toward Russia and a more cautious posture on China, see “Geopolitics: Power as Policy 2026,” Amundi Research Center.
For deeper U.S.–Europe cooperation on energy, technology, and intelligence, see the same (sections on transatlantic coordination).
On NATO’s enlargement, higher spending, and improved capabilities by the mid‑2020s, see NATO‑focused discussion in “Reading Power in 2026: What the U.S. National Security Strategy Signals for Global Business.”
For Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines tightening security ties with Washington, see “Geopolitics in 2026: Risks and Opportunities We’re Watching,” especially the Indo‑Pacific section.
On India’s continued hedging but gradual tilt toward U.S. technology and defense cooperation, see “Geopolitics: Power as Policy 2026.”
For China’s naval expansion and a more contested Western Pacific, see “China Economic Consolidation and Strategic Shifts in 2026” and related regional security analysis.
On the United States as the only state with truly global power‑projection, unmatched logistics, bases, and combat experience, see “The 2026 National Defense Strategy: Decoding the Pentagon’s Priorities,” Atlas Institute, February 18, 2026.
For descriptions of U.S. political polarization and institutional conflict in the mid‑2020s, see “Geopolitics in 2026: Risks and Opportunities We’re Watching.”
On rivals misreading U.S. volatility as weakness and overextending, see examples discussed in “Geopolitics: Power as Policy 2026.”
For the argument that U.S. domestic turbulence has produced a more resilient and distributed form of power rather than straightforward decline, see “Reading Power in 2026: What the U.S. National Security Strategy Signals for Global Business.”
On U.S. cultural and technological influence through media, platforms, and technology firms, see “Geopolitics: Power as Policy 2026” (section on soft power and digital platforms).
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