Previously, I wrote the essay entitled Russia is not a conservative country
In recent years, Russia has increasingly been portrayed—particularly in parts of Western media and online commentary—as a conservative alternative to the liberal West. This image is reinforced by rhetoric about traditional values, nationalism, and resistance to progressive social movements. However, when Russia is evaluated against the enduring standards that have historically defined conservatism—family stability, religious devotion, moral discipline, liberty, rule of law, honest government, and responsible stewardship—the narrative collapses.
Symbolism and selective policies do not make a society conservative. Lived reality does.
1. Marriage, Divorce, and Personal Conduct
Russia has one of the highest divorce rates in the world, ranking third globally. Such a figure reflects chronic instability in family life. Conservative societies prioritize marriage as a durable institution and actively encourage marital permanence.
Even Russia’s leadership does not embody these ideals. Vladimir Putin is divorced, and credible reporting has described children born outside marriage following that divorce. While personal failings alone do not define a nation, conservatism traditionally expects moral example from those in power.
2. Religion as Cultural Identity, Not Practice
Christian conservatism is historically inseparable from active religious life. In Russia, religiosity is largely symbolic.
Although a large majority of Russians identify as Orthodox Christians, church attendance is extremely low—often estimated at around one percent weekly. Even generous surveys show that only a small minority attend services regularly. Orthodoxy in Russia functions more as a marker of national identity than as a lived moral framework.
This pattern aligns with findings from the Pew Research Center, which has consistently reported low religious practice across much of Eastern Europe. Conservatism rooted in faith cannot survive without religious discipline.
3. Fertility and Demographic Decline
Conservatives emphasize family formation, child-rearing, and generational continuity. Russia’s fertility rate—approximately 1.58 births per woman—is well below the replacement level of 2.1.
The result is a deep demographic crisis marked by population decline, aging, labor shortages, and long-term economic stagnation. A society that cannot reproduce itself biologically cannot plausibly claim to be socially conservative.
4. Abortion and the Culture of Life
Despite rhetorical opposition to abortion, Russia continues to experience extraordinarily high abortion rates. Hundreds of thousands of abortions occur annually, even after decades of decline.
Putin has opposed outright abortion bans while conceding abortion harms state interests—an acknowledgment of demographic damage without moral resolve. Conservatism without a consistent ethic of life is incoherent.
5. Alcoholism, Drug Abuse, and Moral Disorder
Russia has one of the highest rates of alcoholism in the world and a severe HIV/AIDS epidemic driven largely by intravenous drug use and unprotected heterosexual sex.
Traditional conservatism treats addiction not merely as a medical problem but as a moral and social failure requiring cultural reform. Russia’s continued struggle in these areas reflects deep societal dysfunction rather than conservative renewal.
According to a widely cited list based on World Population Review estimates, Russia is ranked #1 in the world for per-capita alcohol consumption in 2025, with an average of 16.8 liters of pure alcohol per person per year.
6. Domestic Violence and the Failure of Chivalry
High alcoholism rates, weak law enforcement, and cultural tolerance for abuse have fueled widespread domestic violence. Rather than strengthening protections for women and children, Russian authorities have often minimized or weakened legal consequences for abuse.
A society that fails to protect women and families cannot credibly claim allegiance to conservative ideals of honor, restraint, and chivalry.
7. Law, Order, and Corruption
Conservatives emphasize the rule of law, impartial justice, and accountability. Russia instead functions as a kleptocratic system characterized by politicized courts, endemic corruption, and selective enforcement.
Police shortages, fabricated confessions, rising violent crime, and entrenched organized-crime networks indicate institutional decay rather than moral order.
8. Liberty and Gun Rights
Unlike conservative societies such as the United States or Switzerland, Russia maintains highly restrictive gun laws and limited civil liberties. Conservatism assumes citizens are capable of self-government; authoritarianism assumes the opposite. Russia reflects the latter.
9. Alignment With Communist China
Russia’s close strategic partnership with China further undermines claims of conservatism. Under Xi Jinping, China enforces state atheism and has intensified religious persecution.
A genuinely conservative civilization does not align itself with regimes hostile to religious freedom and natural rights.
10. Public Attitudes: Russians Are Not Socially Conservative
Survey data show that Russians—believers and non-believers alike—hold largely non-conservative views on abortion, premarital sex, divorce, and church involvement in politics. Only a minority believe the Russian Orthodox Church should influence governance.
Conservatism imposed from above without popular conviction is political theater, not culture.
The 2021 LegitRuss Survey indicates that Russians aren't very conservative as indicated by:
To understand the extent to which Russians actually share conservative values, the best initial strategy is to ask them directly, and also to ask multiple questions to make sure our conclusions are not skewed by any particular wording. LegitRuss principal investigators Kolstø and Blakkisrud have already taken us part of the way, reporting that Russians are not, on the whole, actually very “traditional” when it comes to religiosity. In fact, they find that believers differ very little from non-believers on issues such as abortion, premarital sex, and divorce, with society overall being largely split, if not leaning toward the non-conservative position. In addition, just over half, 56 percent, report belonging to a religious denomination at all, and of these, only 81 percent belong to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), and 14 percent are Muslim. Only a decided minority of 26 percent think that the ROC should have a say in politics, with 71 percent opposing this. That said, 40 percent do confess to agreeing that it is God’s plan for Russia to be successful—large share of the population but still not a majority.
Source: How Conservative Are Russians? Findings from the 2021 LegitRuss Survey, Ponars Eurasia, 2022
Other sources provided in the footnotes section.
Younger Russians Are Even Less Conservative Than Older Generations
Multiple sociological surveys show that Russia’s younger generations are even less socially conservative than their parents and grandparents. Younger Russians report lower religiosity, weaker attachment to traditional family norms, more permissive attitudes toward premarital sex and cohabitation, and significantly less interest in the Russian Orthodox Church playing any role in public life. They are also more secular, more individualistic, and more skeptical of state‑imposed “traditional values.” This generational pattern indicates that Russia is not becoming more conservative over time; it is moving in the opposite direction (see: Footnotes for today's younger Russians being less conservative than older generations ).
11. Work Ethic, Productivity, and Stewardship
Biblical conservatism emphasizes diligence, productivity, and generational stewardship—principles articulated by King Solomon in Proverbs. Russia, however, struggles with low labor productivity, a shrinking skilled workforce, and weak economic dynamism.
An economy dominated by bureaucratic control rather than entrepreneurial vitality undermines conservative social foundations.
12. Business, Government, and Freedom
Conservatives favor limited, honest government and vibrant private enterprise. Russia’s business environment suppresses small and medium-sized businesses while expanding bureaucratic power. The result is corruption, dependency, and stagnation.
13. LGBT Policy Is Not a Reliable Marker of Conservatism
Russia’s restrictions on LGBT activism are often cited as evidence of conservatism. Historically, however, anti-homosexuality laws have been common in explicitly non-conservative and anti-religious regimes.
The Soviet Union criminalized male homosexuality for decades—not from Christian moral teaching, but from communist ideology and state enforcement of conformity. These laws coexisted with militant atheism and persecution of the Church.
Similarly, China criminalized homosexuality for much of the communist period while enforcing forced abortions, coercive population control, and religious repression.
Cuba also imposed harsh anti-homosexuality policies after its communist revolution, including forced labor camps for homosexuals, alongside the suppression of civil liberties and religion.
These cases demonstrate that opposition to homosexuality alone does not constitute conservatism. Authoritarian regimes often restrict homosexuality for reasons of social control or ideological uniformity, not because of commitment to faith, family, or liberty.
14. War, Just War Theory, and Fiscal Reality
Christian conservatism is guided by Just War Theory, articulated by Saint Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. By these standards, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine fails.
The war does not meet the criteria of last resort, proportionality, or moral restraint. At best, it was a preventive war; at worst, a war of aggression accompanied by documented war crimes.
The economic burden of the war further underscores its incompatibility with conservative stewardship. Russia is now devoting roughly five to seven percent of its gross domestic product to military and security spending related to the conflict—an extraordinary share for a non-existential war. This level of expenditure diverts vast resources away from families, healthcare, infrastructure, education, and demographic renewal.
To sustain this effort, the Russian state has raised taxes and expanded mandatory revenue measures, including higher levies on individuals and businesses, explicitly to finance military spending. For conservatives, compelling ordinary citizens to fund an open-ended war through increased taxation—while domestic social and demographic crises worsen—represents fiscal irresponsibility, not patriotism.
Conservatism restrains power and prioritizes stewardship. It does not glorify perpetual war financed by heavier burdens on families.
Conclusion
Russia presents conservative aesthetics while embodying deeply non-conservative realities: family breakdown, demographic collapse, moral disorder, weak faith, corruption, authoritarian control, and an economically draining war effort.
Conservatism is not nationalism, censorship, or selective moral enforcement. It is a coherent moral ecosystem rooted in family, faith, liberty, responsibility, rule of law, and prudent stewardship.
Measured by those standards, Russia is still not a conservative country.
Footnote (See also: Footnotes for the essay Russia is still not a conservative country )
On Russia’s global divorce ranking and family instability
World Population Review, “Divorce Rate by Country 2024,” accessed February 2026, https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/divorce-rate-by-country.On Vladimir Putin’s divorce and reported children born outside marriage
Steven Lee Myers, The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin (New York: Vintage, 2016), 445–447.
See also: Andrew Osborn, “Putin’s Family Life Shrouded in Secrecy,” Reuters, March 4, 2013.On low regular church attendance in Russia despite high self-identification as Orthodox
Yana Roshchina, “Religiosity in Russia: Identity vs. Practice,” Higher School of Economics, Moscow, 2019.
Pew Research Center, “Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe,” May 10, 2017.On Russia’s fertility rate and demographic crisis
World Bank, “Fertility rate, total (births per woman) – Russian Federation,” data updated 2024, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=RU.
International Monetary Fund, “Russian Federation: Demographic Headwinds and Economic Prospects,” IMF Country Report, no. 22/45 (2022).On annual abortion numbers and high abortion rates
Statista, “Number of Abortions in Russia from 2000 to 2022,” accessed February 2026, https://www.statista.com.
Guttmacher Institute, “Abortion Worldwide 2022: Uneven Progress and Unequal Access,” regional profile: Eastern Europe and Russia.On Putin’s stance that abortion is against state interests but opposing a ban
“Putin Says Abortions Against State Interests, But Opposes Ban,” Barron’s, December 13, 2023.On alcoholism, drug use, and HIV/AIDS epidemic in Russia
World Health Organization, “Global Status Report on Alcohol and Health 2018,” country profile: Russian Federation.
UNAIDS, “Russian Federation: HIV and AIDS Estimates,” latest update 2023, https://www.unaids.org.On Russia’s per‑capita alcohol consumption ranking and 16.8 liters figure for 2025
World Population Review, “Alcohol Consumption by Country 2025,” accessed February 2026, https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/alcohol-consumption-by-country.On domestic violence, weak protections, and legal minimization of abuse
“Russia’s Leaders Won’t Deal With a Domestic Violence Epidemic. These Women Stepped Up Instead,” TIME, March 4, 2021.
Human Rights Watch, “Russia: Domestic Violence Law Harms Women,” January 25, 2017.On corruption, kleptocracy, politicized courts, and organized crime
Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2024,” country profile: Russia.
Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014).
Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Mafia State’ and Russian Organized Crime,” European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Memo, November 2014.On police shortages, fabricated confessions, and rising violent crime
“Russia Facing ‘Critical’ Shortage of Police,” Newsmax, October 1, 2023.
“Russia Suffers Gun Crime Explosion as Police Say Cases Have Gone Up by 600%,” Newsweek, November 27, 2022.On restrictive gun laws and limited civil liberties compared to the U.S. and Switzerland
GunPolicy.org, “Russian Federation – Gun Facts, Figures and the Law,” University of Sydney, accessed February 2026.
Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2025: Russia,” https://freedomhouse.org.On the strategic partnership with China and Russia–China alignment
“China and Russia Declare ‘No Limits’ Partnership,” Reuters, February 4, 2022.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on International Relations Entering a New Era,” February 2022.On state atheism and religious persecution in China
U.S. Department of State, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: China (Includes Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong).
Open Doors, “World Watch List 2024: China,” https://www.opendoors.org.On Russian public attitudes to abortion, premarital sex, divorce, and church influence in politics
LegitRuss Survey (Kolstø and Blakkisrud, eds.), “Conservatism and Values in Contemporary Russia,” 2021 survey results summary.
Pew Research Center, “Attitudes Toward Gender Roles, Sexuality, and Religion in Eastern Europe,” 2019.On low labor productivity and demographic/economic challenges
OECD, “Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 2019,” chapter on productivity.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), “Demographic Decline and Productivity in Russia,” Working Paper, 2022.On Russia’s unfriendly business environment and pressure on small and medium enterprises
World Bank, “Doing Business 2020,” country profile: Russian Federation.
Kennan Institute, Yevgenia Albats, “The Fate of Small Business and Democracy in Russia,” lecture summary, 2002.On Soviet criminalization of male homosexuality and its ideological character
Dan Healey, Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia: The Regulation of Sexual and Gender Dissent (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
Laurie Essig, Queer in Russia: A Story of Sex, Self, and the Other (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999).On criminalization of homosexuality and repression in communist China and Cuba
Elisabeth L. Engebretsen and William F. Schroeder, eds., Queer/Tongzhi China: New Perspectives on Research, Activism and Media Cultures (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2015).
Lillian Faderman, The Gay Revolution: The Story of the Struggle (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015), chapter on Cuba and revolutionary regimes.On Just War Theory (Augustine and Aquinas)
Augustine, Contra Faustum Manichaeum, book 22; see also The City of God, book 19.
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 40, “Of War.”On the Ukraine invasion failing Just War criteria and documented war crimes
United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, “Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine,” various issues 2022–2024.
International Criminal Court, “Situation in Ukraine: ICC Issues Arrest Warrant for Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin,” March 17, 2023.On Russian war‑related military and security spending reaching roughly 5–7% of GDP
International Monetary Fund, “Russia: 2024 Article IV Consultation – Press Release; Staff Report,” November 2024, section on fiscal policy and defense spending.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Trends in World Military Expenditure 2024,” country data on Russia.On tax increases and mandatory revenue measures to fund the war
“Russia Plans Tax Hikes to Fund War Effort,” Financial Times, June 2024.
“Russia Approves Largest Tax Increase in Decades Amid Soaring War Costs,” Bloomberg, June 26, 2024.
For an overview of survey data showing attitudinal gaps between younger and older Russians on social issues and tolerance toward minorities, see: Center for European Policy Analysis, “Russian Youth and Civic Engagement,” October 10, 2022. Available at: https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/russian-youth-and-civic-engagement/
On lower religiosity and weaker attachment to the Russian Orthodox Church among younger Russians compared with older cohorts, see: Re:Russia, “Declarative Orthodoxy: After Ten Years of Orthodox Propaganda, What Do Russians Really Believe?,” April 22, 2025. Available at: https://re-russia.net/en/analytics/0283/
On young Russians’ limited interest in “traditional and religious values” as a foundation for Russia’s future, and their low emphasis on Orthodox values as a unifying force, see: Journal of Democracy, “Why Russia’s Youth Don’t Support Putin’s War,” June 16, 2025. Available at: https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/why-russias-youth-dont-support-putins-war/
For broader evidence that younger Russians hold more liberal, secular, and globally open views than older generations, including more accepting attitudes toward LGBTQ people and Western culture, see: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Will a New Generation of Russians Modernize Their Country?,” February 3, 2022. Available at: https://carnegie.ru/commentary/86355
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